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I. INTRODUCTION
The Pacific, the world's largest ocean, contains many of the world's
smallest countries. Most of these isolated islands were under colonial
domination from the mid-19th century (or earlier) until about the 1970s,
when they became independent. New Zealand (Aotearoa) and Australia
participate in many Pacific regional organizations and activities. They are
viewed as partners but play separate and different, while still important,
roles because of their larger size and differences in culture and history.
Regionalism in the Pacific is made complex, not only because of vast
geography and cultural diversity, but also because a number of the Pacific
Islands are still non-self-governing. For instance, American Samoa, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam remain
under the sovereignty of the United States.' American Samoa and Guam
are "unincorporated territories" without an indigenously-created governing
document and without the ability to make final decisions for themselves
or to participate effectively in decisions reached in Washington (i.e.,
their residents cannot vote for voting-members of Congress or for the
President). The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas has a "Covenant
to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America,",2 which establishes
1. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships between
the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445 (1992).
2. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, set out under 48 U.S.C. note § 1801
(West 1983), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 651 (1976).
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its relationship with the United States; but it also has no voting
representation in Washington, and the extent to which it has any real
autonomy from federal oversight is disputed and unresolved. The status
of each of these island communities is thus unique under United States
and international law, but alike in the sense that they both have neither
voting representation in Washington nor effective control over their
ocean resources. Recent amendments to the Magnuson Act permit these
island communities to retain the revenues from their ocean resources,
but the legislation says that they can use these revenues only for the
purposes of managing the resources and not for any other purposes.
French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia are overseas
territories of France. They have voting representation in the French
Parliament and limited self-government, but decisions regarding foreign
relations and ocean resources are made in Paris. Because these island
communities are generally not allowed to take seats at regional meetings
on their own, they enter as part of the delegations of the United States or
France or as observers or are excluded altogether. Tiny Pitcairn, where
the descendants of the Bounty mutiny still live, is controlled by the
United Kingdom. Tokelau has its own unique status-it is still under the
direct sovereignty of New Zealand.
To add further complications and confusions, the Federated States of
Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of
Palau are freely associated states with the United States, and the Cook
Islands and Niue (population about 2,100) are freely associated states
with New Zealand. These island communities are viewed as essentially
independent, with the right to conduct their own foreign affairs. They
belong to the United Nations and are able to participate in regional
organizations in their own right, but they still maintain close links with
their larger partner countries.
The regional organizations of this region used to be titled "South
Pacific," but today the term "Pacific" is increasingly used. "Pacific" better
characterizes the region because the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau (all
situated north of the equator) have become active members of these
organizations since they emerged from their colonial status in the late
1980s and early 1990s and because Guam and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands also participate in some of them.
Hawaii is generally not involved in the regional organizations of the
Pacific because, as one of the fifty states, it is an integral part of the
United States and is thus viewed by the rest of the Pacific, perhaps with
some suspicion, as separate and distinct. But Hawaii is frequently used as a
convenient meeting spot. The University of Hawaii has a Center for Pacific
Islands Studies and the East-West Center coordinates research projects
aimed at the concerns of the Pacific through its Pacific Islands Development
Program. This Program, governed by the leaders of its twenty-two members,
has been effective in identifying research priorities and coordinating
academic work relevant to the region, focusing particularly on private-
sector development and management training.
3
Although the regional organizations described below have achieved
many goals on behalf of the Pacific Islands, their existence is sometimes
viewed as a mixed blessing because they are staffed by some of the most
talented individuals in the Pacific, who are thereby not available to assist
their own governments more directly.
II. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC
A. Secretariat of the Pacific Community (formerly the
South Pacific Commission)
The South Pacific Commission (SPC) was formed in 1947 by the
nations with colonies in the Pacific in order to maintain the stability of
the region and assist with education, health, and economic development
in their colonies.4 Most of the island colonies also became members of
the organization, and its meetings have featured a unique mix of
representatives from both the metropolitan powers and the islands
themselves. In the 1960s, as the movement toward decolonialization
picked up momentum, a growing feeling that the colonial nations were
interlopers in the area led to a revolution of sorts. The island members
worked to change the SPC's form and mission, moving to "replace
trusteeship with collegial co-operation ... and technical expertise with
direct financial assistance., 5 This revolution, as well as the rapid growth
of independence in the South Pacific, led to the formation in 1965 of the
3. John Low, Overview of Ocean and Coastal Issues in the Pacfic for the Pacific
Island States, in OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC
REGION 137, 152 (Douglas M. Johnston & Ankana Sirivivatnanon, eds., 2002).
4. See Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, The Emergence of a Regional
Ocean Regime in the South Pacific, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 171, 179 (1989); Jon M. Van
Dyke & Susan Heftel, Tuna Management in the Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency, 3 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 4 n.9 (1981); Martin Tsamenyi, Maritime
Cooperation in the South Pacific: Trends and Opportunities, in OCEAN GOVERNANCE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC REGION, supra note 3, at 130-31.
5. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 4 (citing Richard Herr, Regionalism in the
South Seas: The Impact of the South Pacific Commission, 1947-1974 (1976) (unpublished
dissertation, Duke University)).
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first purely indigenous regional organization, the Pacific Island Producers
Association (PIPA), followed soon by the South Pacific Forum (discussed
infra). Today the SPC is no longer viewed as the colonial body it once
was. It now has 27 members 6 (the same as the South Pacific Regional
Environmental Programme (SPREP)) and has recently been renamed the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community to acknowledge its Northern
Pacific members and to move away from the colonialism implied in the
word "commission."7 This body has concentrated on technical assistance
and has focused, for instance, on the development of the tuna industry,
providing important data on the development of small-scale coastal
fisheries through its tuna tagging projects, and on assisting Pacific Island
countries in their efforts to comply with international maritime treaties.
Its present objectives are to provide advisory, consultative, and training
services to governments on scientific, economic, social, environmental,
health, agricultural, rural development, education, demographic, and cultural
matters.
B. The Pacific Islands Forum
Largely to counter the SPC's big-power domination, the independent
and self-governing island countries in the Pacific created the South
Pacific Forum in 1971, which is now called the Pacific Islands Forum.
This new organization has had a broad political agenda. Its Secretariat is
based in Suva, Fiji, and it acts through an annual meeting attended by
the heads of member governments.8 The environment has been only one
of the many issues it has addressed, but by unifying the South Pacific
Island nations, it paved the way for organizations which could address
the environmental concerns of the entire region. Each newly independent
nation has been invited to join the Forum, and it now contains 16
members: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
6. The 27 members are American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, France,
Federated States of Micronesia, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, New Zealand, Northern Marianas, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Pitcairn, Samoa, Solomon Islands, United Kingdom, United States, Tokelau, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. See Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Members
of the SPC, at http://www.spc.org.nc/AC/members.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2004).
7. See Secretariat of the Pacific Community, SPC's History, at http://www.spc.
org.nc/AC/history.htm, (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); Flags of the World, PAcIIC COMMUNrrY,
available at http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/spc.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
8. The Secretariat was originally called the South Pacific Bureau for Economic
Cooperation (SPEC), but now is called the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Samoa (formerly "Western Samoa"), Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The Forum has created the important Forum Fisheries
Agency, provided the venue to negotiate the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), assisted with the development of the SPREP
Treaty, promoted the Ocean Resources Management Training Program,
9
assisted in the development of the 1995 Treaty of Waigani on the
movements of hazardous and radioactive wastes, and issued important
statements drawing attention to the inadequacies of the international
regime governing the shipment of ultrahazardous radioactive cargoes by
sea (discussed below). "The Forum Secretariat also provides policy advice
to member countries on matters related to marine resources and
international trade in such resources."10
C. The Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific
The Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific
was adopted in Apia, Samoa on June 12, 1976, and came into force in
the 1990s (and is sometimes called the Apia Convention). Its purpose was
to take action for the conservation, utilization, creation, and development
of natural resources of the region through careful planning and management.
In particular, the parties are encouraged to create protected areas to
safeguard natural ecosystems, superlative scenery, striking geological
formations, and areas of historic, cultural, aesthetic, or scientific value."
D. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ)
In 1985, under the auspices of the Forum, the nations of the South
Pacific adopted the SPNFZ,12 creating a unique nuclear free zone in the
Pacific. The parties to the Treaty agreed to prevent testing, stationing,
manufacturing, and dumping of nuclear weapons and devices within
their territories and to discourage the use of the region for nuclear testing
and waste disposal. 13 The treaty permits, however, nuclear-powered
vessels and ships carrying nuclear weapons to go through the waters
9. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 4, at 180-81, 184-85.
10. Tsamenyi, supra note 4, at 131.
11. Florian Gubon, Steps Taken by South Pacific Island States to Preserve and
Protect Ocean Resources for Future Generations, in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21 ST
CENTURY [hereinafter FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS] 121, 124-25 (Jon M. Van Dyke, Durwood
Zaelke, and Grant Hewison, eds., 1993).
12. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440. The
treaty came into force in 1986 when Australia became the eighth nation to ratify it. See
generally INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: ROCKS AND SHOALS AHEAD? 352-72 (Jon M.
Van Dyke, Lewis M. Alexander, and Joseph K. Morgan, eds., 1988).
13. See Gubon, supra note 11, at 125-26.
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covered by the treaty without restrictions, leading some to question
whether it has any real impact.' 4 France continued to test nuclear weapons
at Muroroa in French Polynesia for a number of years, 5 but finally ended
that program in 1996. The SPNFZ treaty has been important as a symbolic
statement issued by the Pacific Island community, and with the end of
the Cold War and the easing of international tension, it may be possible
to revisit the text and tighten the regime it created.'
6
E. The South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP)
1. The Early Days
The idea of a South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme was
originally conceived at a nature conservation workshop in 1969, which
led to a workshop in 1973, which in turn led to a program for the
conservation of nature included within the SPC's agenda in 1973.17
SPREP was formally established in 1982 as a joint initiative of the SPC
and the Forum. In 1982, at the Conference on the Human Environment
in the South Pacific, the delegates decided to set up SPREP as a separate
entity within the SPC. At this conference, SPREP produced its first
"Action Plan for Managing the Natural Resources of the South Pacific
Region." This document was revised in 1991 and 1997, and it remains
the focus of SPREP's activities.
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL HAMEL-GREEN, THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
TREATY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 25-27 (1990); Ramesh Thakur, The Treaty of
Rarotonga: The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, in NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES 39-43
(David Pitt & Gordon Thompson eds., 1987); Greg Fry, Regional Arms Control in the
South Pacific, in NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, id. at 46-66; Peter Glebbeek, The South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. A Lost Battle Against the Superpowers? 10-11 (Institute of
Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, Working Paper Series No. 73, 1990).
15. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Kirk R. Smith, and Suliana Siwatibau,
Nuclear Activities and Pacific Islanders, 9 ENERGY 733 (1984).
16. Article 5(2) of the treaty allows each nation in the region to decide for itself if
it wants to give port access and/or navigation rights to nuclear armed and/or propelled
vessels. Glebbeek, supra note 14, at 14-15.
17. For more on SPREP's history, see generally, South Pacific Regional
Environmental Programme, What's SPREP, available at http://www.sprep.org.ws/sprep/
about.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); see also South Pacific Regional Environmental
Programme, SPREP Annual Report 1995/96 at 9 (1996) [hereinafter Annual Report
1995/96]. Arthur Dahl, who had been with the Smithsonian Institute in Washington,
D.C., and more recently has worked at the United Nations Environment Programme, is
recognized as "SPREP's founding father" and was the sole Regional Ecological Advisor
in the SPC in 1974. V-Files-The Early Days of SPREP: A Roundtable with Arthur,
ENV'T NEWSL. (SPREP), Dec. 1997, at 9.
During the early 1980s, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) provided funds to permit the Pacific Island countries to
negotiate a regional-seas treaty, which was completed in 1986.18 This
treaty is formally titled the "Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region,"' 9 but it is
usually informally called the "SPREP Treaty." The SPREP Treaty is
designed to protect both the land and marine resources of the region and
contains two protocols--one on waste dumping and another on combating
pollution emergencies. The SPREP Treaty was particularly important in
that it completely prohibited the dumping of both high- and low-level
nuclear waste in the area it covered.20 Although the Mediterranean 21 and
Baltic 22 Treaties also contained such prohibition, the Pacific region is
much larger and contains sites that were considered by many as
appropriate for nuclear waste dumping. Nonetheless, in an important
concession that led to the later ban on all nuclear waste dumping in the
1996 Protocol23 to the 1972 London Convention,24 the United States
agreed to the prohibition. The SPREP Treaty also contains valuable
provisions requiring environmental assessments with regard to any major
activity affecting the SPREP Treaty area.
25
After the SPREP Treaty was completed in 1986, bi-annual intergovernmental
meetings began to be held, and after 1990, these meetings became
annual events. Also in 1986, a five-member steering committee was
established, consisting of representatives from Polynesia, Melanesia,
Micronesia, the metropolitan powers (France/United Kingdom/USA),
and Australia/New Zealand.
In 1991, the leaders of SPREP decided that the organization should
become autonomous from SPC and the Forum. Samoa offered to host
the organization's headquarters, and SPREP moved to Apia, Samoa in
1992. In 1993, SPREP's members signed the Agreement Establishing
the South Pacific Regional Environment Program in order to formalize
18. See Jon M. Van Dyke, The United States and Japan in Relation to the
Resources, the Environment, and the People of the Pacific Island Region, 16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 217, 222-23 (1989).
19. Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 [hereinafter SPREP Treaty].
20. Id. at art. 10(1). Subseabed emplacement was also prohibited. Id.
21. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb.
16, 1976, art. 4, 15 I.L.M. 290, 291(1976); id at Annex I(A)(7).
22. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, March 22, 1974, art. 9, 13 1.L.M. 544, 549 (1974).
23. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALzMAN, & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 767-70 (1998).
24. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Nov. 13, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1291, 1295 (1972).
25. SPREP Treaty, supra note 19, art. 16.
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its new status as an independent intergovernmental organization. 26 In
1995, Niue became the tenth nation to ratify this Agreement and SPREP
27officially became autonomous.
2. SPREP Today
SPREP's 27 members are the same as the members of the Secretariat
of the Pacific Community (described above), and they follow the same
model which allows all political entities to participate in their activities,
whether they are independent or not.28 In its 1997-2000 Action Plan,
SPREP described its primary four-year goal as "[t]o build national capacity
to protect and improve the environment of the region for the benefit of
Pacific island people now and in the future.,,29 Its five objectives were
identified as follows:
1. To protect natural heritage through the conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity;
2. To understand and respond to climate change, particularly
through integrated coastal management;
3. To minimize pollution and wastes and improve preparedness
for pollution emergencies;
4. To plan, manage, and regulate development in a manner that
is environmentally sustainable; and
5. To strengthen environmental education, training, and information
systems.
The staff of SPREP grew from fewer than ten in the 1980s to about
thirty-five by the time the organization moved its headquarters to Apia in
1992. Today, SPREP has more than sixty full-time employees, working
throughout the Pacific Islands. SPREP's budget, almost entirely based
26. Tsamenyi, supra note 4, at 132.
27. For more on the SPREP Treaty, see Mere Pulea, The Unfinished Agenda for
the Pacific to Protect the Ocean Environment, in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS, supra note 11,
at 103, 107-10, and A.V.S. Va'ai, The Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region: Its Strengths and Weaknesses,
in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS, id. at 113-20.
28. Annual Report 1995/96, supra note 17, at 7. The 27 political units are listed
supra note 6.
29. South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, SPREP Action Plan for
Managing the Environment of the South Pacific Region 1997-2000, at 6 (April 1997)
[hereinafter 1997-2000 Action Plan], available at http://www.sprep.org/ws/publication/
publist.asp.
30. Id.
on contributions, has also been steadily growing. In 1995, the total general
budget was about 7.3 million dollars. The largest share came from the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which gave 29
percent of the total budget. The second largest donor was the Australian
Agency for International Development (AusAID), which contributed 27
percent of SPREP's budget. New Zealand gave eight percent, and a
number of other donors gave similar amounts.31 Most of SPREP's
activities are carried out with the assistance of international or national
agencies. Their main current activities include: the South Pacific Biodiversity
Conservation Programme, the Pacific Islands Climate Change Assistance
Programme, and the Programme of Capacity Building for Sustainable
Development in the South Pacific, all funded through the UNDP; the
Waste Management Education and Awareness Programme, funded by
the European Union; the Climate Change and Environmental Education
and Training Programmes, funded through the AusAID; the Atmospheric
and Radiation Measurements in the Tropical Western Pacific, funded by
the U.S. Department of Energy; and meteorological services, in conjunction
with the World Meteorological Organization. SPREP staff members
have recently participated in meetings regarding the Biodiversity and
Climate Change Conventions.
In 1997, SPREP helped coordinate the adoption of a Strategic Action
Programme for International Waters of the Pacific Region to combat the
degradation of water quality and associated critical habitats and the
unsustainable use of resources. For the future, SPREP will be focusing
on protecting the biodiversity of the region, preparing for the impacts of
climate change, promoting integrated coastal management, preventing
pollution, managing wastes (and encouraging the ratification of the
Treaty of Waigani," discussed below), preparing for emergencies, and
building capacity within each island community so that the environment
can be understood and protected.34
3. South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission (SOPAC)
The Pacific Island nations have worked together since 1972 to coordinate
research on deep seabed minerals through an organization first called the
Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources
31. Annual Report 1995/96, supra note 17, at 35. Some donors contribute to particular
projects, as well as to the general budget.
32. Strategic Action Programme for Waters of the Pacific, SPREP's ENvIRONMENT
ENV'TNEWSL., Dec. 1997, at 10.
33. Tamari'i Tutangata, Signing on to Watching Waste, ISLANDs BusiNEss, Sept.
1999, at 48.
34. 1997-2000 Action Plan, supra note 29, at 11, 15, 19, 22, 26.
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in the South Pacific Offshore Areas (CCOP/SOPAC). CCOP/SOPAC
later became known as the South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission
(SOPAC). This organization, based in Suva, Fiji, coordinates research
on the geology of the coastal areas and the sea floor in the Pacific,
focusing on mineral, hydrocarbon, geothermal, and wave resources, and
helps to build national capacity in the geosciences.35 American Samoa,
French Polynesia, and Guam participate in this organization, along with
the 16 independent and freely associated countries who are members of
the Forum.
4. Is There a Pacific Marine Policy Regime?
One knowledgeable commentator has concluded that the Pacific
Island region has not yet achieved a marine policy regime because the
myriad of organizations have different membership, are all underfunded
and dependent on outside donors, and, with the exception of the Forum
36Secretariat, have only limited capacity to develop policy for the region.
To address this problem, the South Pacific Organizations Coordinating
Committee was created in the early 1990s to reduce overlaps.37 This
Committee created a Marine Sector Working Group to develop a regional
ocean policy. 38 This body will be working with the organizations and
conventions listed in the next section to enable the region to develop its
resources in a sustainable fashion and increase revenues from its ocean
resources.
III. FISHERY ORGANIZATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC
A. The Forum Fisheries Agency
In 1979, the 12 countries that were then members of the Forum
established the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). The FFA sought to
coordinate regional fishing concerns in light of the international recognition
(in the drafts that eventually became the 1982 United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention39) of the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone
35. Tsamenyi, supra note 4, at 132.
36. Id. at 133-35. This conclusion was reached using the definition of a marine
policy regime developed in Mark Valencia, Regional Maritime Regime Building:
Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 231 (2000).
37. Tsamenyi, supra note 4, at 136.
38. Id. at 137.
39. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
(EEZ).40 The FFA's members are now the same 16 countries that are
members of the Forum, plus Tokelau, which recently joined on its own
at the urging of New Zealand. Its main functions are to coordinate and
harmonize national policies for fishing in the South Pacific Region,
promote sustainable management techniques, and assist in negotiating
agreements (through its staff based in Honiara, Solomon Islands) with
fishing companies that wish to fish in the EEZs of its members. Other
functions include accumulating detailed and up-to-date information on
aspects of living marine resources in the region; evaluating and analyzing
data to provide clear, timely, concise, complete, and accurate advice to
member countries; and developing and maintaining a communications
network for the dissemination of information to member countries.4'
The FFA members outlawed fishing without a license within their EEZs
zones, but until 1987, the United States refused to recognize these
prohibitions with regard to tuna, a migratory fish that moves from zone to
zone. Eventually, however, political developments led the United States to
agree to meet with leaders of the Pacific Islands and to negotiate a
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty.
This treaty authorized up to fifty U.S. vessels to fish in the EEZs of
the 16 countries in the FFA. The treaty was originally to end in 1993, but
the parties agreed to extend it for another ten years, granting an additional
five licenses to the United States and increasing the price paid to the
island countries for the licenses.43 The FFA distributes the licensing
funds to the individual states, monitors fishing in the EEZs, and provides
observers for the boats.44
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the Sea
Convention].
40. See generally Van Dyke & Heftel, supra note 4.
41. Francis Bugotu, Peter Sitan, and Teekabu Tikai, A Review of the Achievements
of the Forum Fisheries Agency in its First Decade of Operations, in THE FORUM
FISHERIES AGENCY: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 3, 5 (Richard Herr ed.,
1990).
42. Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States
and the Government of the United States of America, Apr. 2, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11100,
26 I.L.M. 1048 [hereinafter FFA-US Treaty], available at http://www.oceanlaw. net/
texts/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). Two incidents which led to the U.S. willingness
to negotiate were the seizing of a U.S. fishing vessel and the beginning of preliminary
negotiations regarding access to fishing between Kiribati and Russia. See generally Jon
M. Van Dyke & Carolyn Nicol, US. Tuna Policy: A Reluctant Acceptance of the International
Norm, in TUNA ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 105 (David J.
Doulman ed., 1987).
43. During the first five years of the original Treaty, the FFA countries were paid
about $12 million per year by the U.S. governments and the tuna fishing industry. After
the extension, the total payment went up to $18 million annually. The Treaty also requires the
U.S. vessels to fund and carry FFA observers on board to monitor compliance and to do
scientific data collection. See FFA-US Treaty, supra note 42.
44. For additional information about the FFA, see Gracie Fong, Governance and
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A DEPICTION OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES IN THE PACIFIC,
AS CLAIMED BY ISLAND AND COASTAL COUNTIES
Stewardship of the Living Resources: The Work of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries
Agency, in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS, supra note 11, at 131-41.
The FFA has worked to restrain illegal fishing by establishing a Regional
Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels and a satellite-based vessel monitoring
system, and it has sought to maximize the economic benefit flowing to
the Pacific Islands from distant-water fishing by establishing Minimum
Terms and Conditions of Access for Foreign Fishing Vessels.45 More
recently, the FFA coordinated the Pacific Islanders' role in the important
multilateral negotiations that produced the Honolulu Convention and
created a new fisheries organization for the Pacific, combining distant-
water fishing countries with the island and coastal countries of the
region (discussed below).46
B. The Wellington Driftnet Convention
One example of swift collective action taken by Pacific Islanders was
their adoption in 1989 of the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing
with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific47 (often called the Wellington
Convention or the South Pacific Driftnet Convention). This treaty was
quickly negotiated because of the concern that large amounts of juvenile
albacore tuna were being harvested through the high-seas driftnetting
utilized by the Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese. The treaty prohibited
the landing or transshipment of driftnet catches in the ports of the
contracting parties, the importation of any fish or fish product caught
with a driftnet, and the possession of any driftnet on board any vessel
within the fisheries jurisdiction of the contracting parties. 48 After adopting
their own treaty, the Pacific Islanders worked effectively together to
promote the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in
1989,49 and again in 1991,50 of resolutions supporting global restrictions
and calling upon countries to ban the use of high seas driftnets entirely.
45. Tsamenyi, supra note 4, at 131.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 57-62.
47. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South
Pacific, Nov. 24, 1989 (Wellington), and Oct. 20, 1990 (Noumea), 29 I.L.M. 1449.
48. See generally Gubon, supra note 11, at 126-27.
49. Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 44/225, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
85th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, U.N.Doc. A/44/746/Add.7 (1989), adopted by consensus
Dec. 22, 1989, reprinted in 20 ENVT'L POLY & L. 36 (1990).
50. G.A. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N.Doc. A/RES/46/215 (1991). See
generally HUNTER, supra note 23, at 721-31.
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C. The 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement
51
On December 4, 1995, the nations of the world settled on the text of
an important document with the cumbersome title of "Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks., 52 The goal of this document was to stop the dramatic overfishing
that has decimated the fish stocks in many parts of the world.53 It built on
existing provisions in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention,
s4
but it also introduced a number of new strategies that will require the
fishing industry to change its mode of operation in significant ways.
Prominent among these new requirements is precaution. Article 5(c) lists
the "precautionary approach" among the principles that govern conservation
and management of shared fish stocks, and Article 6 elaborates on this
requirement in some detail, focusing on data collection and monitoring.
Then, in Annex II, the Agreement identifies a specific procedure that
must be used to control exploitation and monitor the effects of the
management plan. For each harvested species, a "conservation" or
"limit" reference point as well as a "management" or "target" reference
must be determined. If stock populations go below the agreed-upon
conservation/limit reference point, then "conservation and management
51. This section is adapted and updated from Jon M. Van Dyke, Sharing Ocean
Resources-In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE
COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 3, 9-15 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000);
see also Jon M. Van Dyke, The Straddling and Migratory Stocks Agreement and the
Pacific, II INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 406-415 (1996).
52. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
Conference on Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/37, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Straddling and Migratory
Stocks Agreement].
53. David E. Pitt, Despite Gaps, Data Leave Little Doubt that Fish Are in Peril,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at C4. See generally FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS, supra note 11.
Among the stocks that are now seriously depleted are Atlantic halibut, New Zealand
orange roughy, bluefin tuna, rockfish, herring, shrimp, sturgeon, oysters, shark, Atlantic
and some Pacific Northwest salmon, American shad, Newfoundland cod, and haddock
and yellowtail flounder off of New England. Steps Must Be Taken to Counter
Overfishing, U.S. Panel Warns, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Oct. 23, 1998, at A19 (quoting
from a study led by Stanford biologist Harold Mooney and funded by the National
Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences); Craig S. Smith, North
Sea Cod Crisis Brings Call for Nations to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A3.
54. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 39, at arts. 56, 61-66, 69-70, 118-20.
action should be initiated to facilitate stock recovery" (Annex 11(5)).
Overfished stocks must be managed to ensure that they can recover to
the level at which they can produce the maximum sustainable yield
(Annex 11(7)). The continued reference to the maximum-sustainable-yield
formula indicates that the Agreement has not broken completely free
from the approaches that led to the rapid decline in the world's fisheries,55
but the hope is that the conservation/limit reference points will lead to
early warnings of trouble that will be taken more seriously.56
D. The Honolulu Convention
The Pacific Island and Pacific Rim nations met every six months for
several years in Honolulu in the late 1990s to draft an important new
treaty governing the migratory fish stocks of the Pacific Ocean.
Formally called "The Convention on the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean" 5 and signed in Honolulu in September 2000, this treaty created
55. Fishing to attain the maximum sustainable yield inevitably means reducing the
abundance of a stock, sometimes by one-half or two-thirds. This reduction can threaten
the stock in unforeseeable ways and also will have an impact on other species in the
ecosystem.
56. One recent report explains the "precautionary approach" in the context of the
1995 Straddling and Migratory Stocks Agreement, supra note 52, as follows:
The precautionary approach, in summary, embodies six main elements:
" caution (to be applied widely, to protect resources, and preserve the
environment); more caution required when uncertainty; absence of adequate
information no reason for failing to take measures;
" information and analysis (obtain and share best available information; need to
deal with risk and uncertainty);
" reference points (use of limit and target reference points for conservation and
management objectives respectively; develop plans as LRPs [limit reference
points] are approached or TRPs [target reference points] exceeded);
* non-target species, associated or dependent species and their environment
(assess impacts of fishing; ensure conservation of species and protection of
habitat);
* new or exploratory fisheries (early adoption of cautious measures or PRPs,
remaining in effect until fishery impacts assessed; gradual development; set
provisional reference points); and
* natural phenomena (adopt conservation and management measures to ensure
fishing does not exacerbate the situation).
Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish, May 28-
June 6, 1998, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, in Appendix I (Record of Discussion of the Workshop
on Precautionary Limit Reference Points), at 66; see generally Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precautionary Principle, in BRINGING
NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 357-79 (David Caron and Harry Scheiber, eds., 2004).
57. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Honolulu, Sept. 4, 2000, available
at http://www.spc.org.nc/coastfish/asides/conventions/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); see
generally Violanda Botet, Filling in One of the Last Pieces of the Ocean: Regulating
Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 787-813 (2001).
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the regional organization anticipated by Article 64 of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention58 and by the 1995 Straddling and Migratory Stocks
Agreement. 59
The Honolulu Convention is breathtakingly innovative in a number of
significant respects. It is huge in its geographical scope, covering much
of the vast Pacific Ocean and governing territorial seas and exclusive
economic zones as well as high seas areas. It creates a Commission with
authority to set catch limits and allocate catch quotas to fishing nations
both within and outside the exclusive economic zones of coastal and
island nations. The Commission can also regulate vessel types, fish size,
and gear and establish area and time limitations. Decision-making is by
consensus for some issues and by chambered voting on others, with the
interests of the distant-water-fishing nations and the island nations both
carefully protected. Decisions of the Commission can be reviewed
by an arbitral review panel to ensure consistency and protect against
discrimination.
This new treaty requires fishing of migratory species in the high seas
to be compatible with the regulations that apply within adjacent
exclusive economic zones. It relies on the precautionary approach as its
basic foundation throughout. It reinforces the importance of the duty to
cooperate. It allows Taiwan to participate in decision-making (as "Chinese
Taipei"), it allows non-self-governing territories to participate (pursuant
to rules to be adopted), and it allows non-governmental organizations to
participate in appropriate ways. Compliance will be through flag-state
and port-state enforcement, boarding and inspection rights, obligatory
transponders on all high-seas fishing vessels, and regional observers on
the vessels.
The final negotiating session was held in Honolulu from August 30 to
September 5, 2000. A treaty was signed by most of the negotiating
parties, but China, France, and Tonga abstained 60 and Japan and South
58. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 39, at art. 64; see generally Van Dyke
& Heftel, supra note 4, at 11-17.
59. 1995 Straddling and Migratory Stocks Agreement, supra note 52.
60. China abstained because of its concern about Taiwan's classification as a
"fishing entity," with some rights to participate separately in decision-making, and
France abstained because it wanted the French islands in the Pacific to have separate
status in the Commission that is to be established. On the role of Taiwan more generally
in regional fishery management organizations, see Yann-huei Song, The Regional
Fishery Management Organizations and Ocean Law: A Perspective from Taiwan, in
BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS (David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
2004).
Korea refused to sign the agreement.61 The FFA members worked hard
during the three-year negotiating period to ensure that the convention
area was as large as possible, that decisions could be made without
unanimous agreement, that developing countries would receive financial
assistance to carry out their obligations under the treaty, that the treaty
could come into force even if the distant-water fishing nations did not
ratify it, and that a vessel monitoring system would become mandatory
for all vessels. Although not all the FFA positions were achieved to the
extent desired,62 the final version of the treaty was signed in September
2000 by all the FFA members except Tonga.
IV. HAZARDOUS AND RADIOACTIVE WASTES-
THE TREATY OF WAIGANI
The Pacific Island countries adopted the Waigani Convention in
September 1995 to regulate the movement of hazardous and radioactive
wastes.6 3 This Convention requires contracting parties to prohibit the
import of hazardous and radioactive wastes, and it establishes mandatory
notification procedures for transboundary movements of nonradioactive
hazardous waste. This treat came into force on October 21, 2001, when
the tenth country ratified it.
V. SEA TRANSPORT OF ULTRAHAZARDOUS
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
65
A new threat to the marine environment has been presented by the
shipments during the past decade of ultrahazardous cargoes of plutonium,
61. Japan and South Korea stated that they view the treaty as too restrictive of their
historic fishing practices in the high seas. These countries have, however, been
participating in some of the subsequent meetings and are expected eventually to ratify
the Convention.
62. Among the many compromises, for instance, was the decision-making provision,
which established two "chambers" consisting of the FFA and the non-FFA members of
the Commission and provided that each chamber would need to support a decision by a
three-fourths majority, with the proviso that no proposal could be defeated by fewer than
three votes in either chamber.
63. Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous
and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management
of Hazardous Wastes Within the South Pacific Region, 2001 Austl. T.S. No. 17, Sept.
16, 1995, available at http://www.greenyearbook.org/agree/haz-sub/waigani.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Waigani Treaty]. This treaty is commonly referred to
as the Waigani Treaty or Convention because it was opened for signature at the 1995
meeting of the Forum in Waigani, Papua New Guinea. Id.
64. See id.
65. For a more complete analysis of this issue, see Jon M. Van Dyke, The Legal
Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials, 33 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 77 (2002).
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mixed-oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel, and high level radioactive wastes back
and forth from Japan to Europe as part of the Japanese nuclear power
program.66 These shipments have caused enormous concern among the
coastal and island nations that could be devastated by an accident or
terrorist attack involving their cargoes. A Chilean naval vessel ordered
the 1994-95 shipment to exit Chile's EEZ, citing the precautionary
principle as a primary reason for banning the British-flag vessel.6 7
Pacific Island nations have vigorously protested these shipments since
they began in the early 1990s. 68 At the meeting of the South Pacific
Forum in October 1999, the Pacific Island leaders called specifically for
a compensation regime to be established that would indemnify the island
communities for any economic losses that their tourism and fishing
industries might suffer as a result of an accident "even if there is no
actual environmental damage caused., 69 This communiqu6 also urged
members to work within the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop "a
strong regime of prior notification to, and [in] consultation with, coastal
states on planned shipments of radioactive materials and MOX fuel
66. See, e.g., Jon M. Van Dyke, Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium under
International Law, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 399 (1993); Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying
the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials, 27 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 379 (1996); Duncan E.J. Currie & Jon M. Van Dyke, The Shipment of
Ultrahazardous Nuclear Materials in International Law, 8 REv. EUR. CMTY. & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 113 (1999).
67. Radiotelephone conversation (March 22, 1994). See in particular Article 23 of
the Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 39, requiring "[f]oreign nuclear-powered
ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances... when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea
[to] carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such
ships by international agreements." (Emphasis added.) Coastal States have the specific
right "to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the
limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and
the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance." Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 39, at art. 234. This provision could strengthen Chile's and
Argentina's claim to ban highly radioactive nuclear carriers from their EEZs.
68. See listing of protests in Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary
Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 379,
386 (1996).
69. Forum Communique, Thirtieth South Pacific Forum, para. 31 (Oct. 3-5, 1999),
available at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/Communique/ForumCommunique.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2004).
(consistent with security requirements) [and to develop] a regime for the
preparation of Environmental Impact Statements and Emergency Response
Plans.' 70 New Zealand has also taken a lead in protesting these shipments,
arguing that they should not be permitted through New Zealand's EEZ
because of the "'precautionary principle' enshrined in the Rio Declaration"
and because "there should be recognition in international law of the right
of potentially affected coastal states to prior notification, and, ideally,
prior informed consent for shipments of nuclear material.'
The countries opposing these shipments argue that passage of such
dangerous cargos through coastal EEZs violates the standards found in
the Law of the Sea Convention, which require countries to prepare
environmental impact statements for matters that may cause substantial
pollution, to prepare contingency plans for accidents,72 to consult with
affected states, and to establish appropriate liability regimes for such
hazards. Some of these nations are now thinking of bringing a claim
under the Law of the Sea Convention's dispute-resolution procedures
against Japan, the United Kingdom, and France. Such a claim could
argue that these nations have violated:
(A) their duties under Articles 204-06 to prepare and disseminate
an environmental impact statement (because "planned
activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause
substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes
to the marine environment");
(B) their duty to consult affected states, including specifically their
duty under Article 199 to "jointly develop and promote
contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents in the
marine environment;"
(C) their general duty under Articles 192 and 235 to "protect and
preserve the marine environment," including the more specific
duty under Article 194(5) "to protect and preserve rare or
fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine
life;" and
(D) their more specific duty under Article 235(3) to create an
appropriate liability regime, including the "development of
70. Id. at para. 33.
71. Letter from Don McKinnon, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, to Michael Szabo (July 7, 1999).
72. The consequences of an accident involving a ship carrying ultrahazardous
radioactive materials would be so grave that emergency procedures must be in place to
address possible fires, collisions, and sinkings. These procedures must include access to
appropriate ports, availability of tugboats and firefighting equipment, and plans for
retrieval in the event of a sinking.
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criteria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation,
such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds."
A series of meetings have been held involving the shipping nations
and the Pacific Island nations regarding the creation of a liability regime,
but the sides remain deeply divided on the need for and details of such a
73regime.
7
VI. LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR74
On July 15, 2002, the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
exempted the U.S. Navy's Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS)
program from the requirements of the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection
Act after determining that its operation would have a "negligible impact"
on any species. 75 NMFS thus authorized the Navy to use two ships to
transmit low frequency active sonar in about seventy-five percent of the
world's oceans (exempting the polar extremes). Ten weeks later, in late
September 2002, fifteen Cuvier's beaked whales beached on the Canary
Islands at the same time the U.S. destroyer Mahan was maneuvering in
the area with ships from nine other members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.76 Autopsies of the whales revealed brain damage
consistent with an acoustic impact.77 This mass stranding followed similar
73. Meetings are sponsored by the Pacific Islands Forum. Five such meetings
have been held to date, including the Fifth Meeting on Liability and Compensation for
the Transport of Radioactive Materials, held in Nadi, Fiji, June 21-25, 2004.
74. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Jon M. Van Dyke, Emily A.
Gardner, and Joseph R. Morgan, Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar, 18 OCEAN
YEARBOOK 330-63 (2004); see also Jon M. Van Dyke, More Bad News for the Whales,
19 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT 20 (2004).
75. Kenneth R. Weiss, Sonar Approved Despite Possible Risks to Whales,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 16, 2002; Marc Kaufman, Navy Cleared to Use a Sonar
Despite Fears of Injuring Whales, WASHINGTON POST, July 16, 2002, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0716-06.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
76. Nine Cuvier's beaked whales were found dead on September 24-25, 2002 on
the Canary Islands of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote. Six beached whales were pushed
back into the sea, and another two were seen floating lifeless in coastal waters. Ships
from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were conducting a multinational exercise known as Neo
Tapon 2002 designed to practice securing the Strait of Gibraltar. The Cuvier's beaked
whale is a toothed cetacean that ranges from five to eight meters in length. Jerome
Socolovsky, Investigation Points to NATO Exercise in Mass Whale Beaching (Oct. 10,
2002), at http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2002/l 0/10 102002/ap_48667.asp (last
visited Feb. 20, 2004).
77. Id. (quoting a researcher as saying that "the only cause which we cannot rule
out ... is acoustic impact").
incidents near the Bahamas in March 2000, near Greece in 1996, and in
the Canaries between 1985 and 1989.
The U.S. Navy's Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)
Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) will employ very loud low-
frequency sounds (less than 500 Hz with intensity levels as great as 230
db78), posing a significant threat to the safety and welfare of marine
mammals and speculatively to other forms of marine life as well. The
transmitted sound will be about 215 db at its source, arrayed in a manner
to have "an effective source level" of 230-240 db.79 According to the
Navy's environmental impact statement (EIS), the sound would be at the
180 db level one kilometer from the source, at 173 db two kilometers
from the source, about 165 db 75 kilometers from the source, at the 150-
160 db level up to 160 kilometers from the source, and some 140 db 640
kilometers from the source vessel.8° (Decibel levels are logarithmic in
nature, so that a sound of 180 db is ten times as intense as one of 170
db.) The sounds are not transmitted uniformly in all directions from the
source, but instead travel in a beam that is about a hundred meters in
width.81 These sounds are the loudest ever put into the world's oceans by
humans, with the possible exception of underground explosions. They
are designed to travel great distances and are audible by humans 1000
kilometers away without any signal processing.
In late October 2002, federal Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. LaPorte
determined that the Navy's use of low frequency active sonar was likely
to violate four federal statutes 82 and to cause irreparable injury to ocean
78. Although the Navy refuses to release the maximum source level of SURTASS
LFA, claiming it to be classified information, reports indicate the maximum source level
to be 230 db re I uPa. See Alexandros Frantzis, Does Military Testing Strand Whales?,
NATURE, March 5, 1998, at 29; see also Quiet Please. Whales Navigating., THE
ECONOMIST, March 7, 1998, at 85.
79. Because of the way sound is measured and the different speed that sound
travels through water, as compared to land, it is estimated that "underwater sound
pressure levels numerically are about 61.5 db greater than sound pressure levels in air for
an equal intensity." ROBERT C. GISINER, PROCEEDINGS: WORKSHOP ON THE EFFECTS OF
ANTHROPOGENIC NOISE IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, 10-12 FEBRUARY 1998 24 (1998).
In other words, sound measured at 131 db in water would have the same pressure impact
as sound measured at 70 db on land. 60 db on land is the sound generated by freeway
traffic. Continuous exposure above 85 db (on land) is likely to degrade the hearing of
most humans. "Deafening" noise (on land) begins at 110 db, with 120 db measuring a
hard rock band, 130 db being the point at which pain is registered, and 140 db being the
point adjacent to a jet engine. The 180 db (in water) figure said by the Navy to be "safe"
for cetaceans would thus affect them at about the same extent as human hearing would
be affected by standing next to a hard rock band at a rock concert, if we can assume that
the hearing system of cetaceans is roughly comparable to ours.
80. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, 232 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1033-34
(N.D.Cal. 2002).
81. Id. at 1034.
82. The four statutes are the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National
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creatures. She thus issued a preliminary injunction restricting the Navy's
actions, but allowed further testing and training of personnel regarding
this system.83 The court explained: "It is undisputed that marine mammals,
many of whom depend on sensitive hearing for essential activities like
finding food and mates and avoiding predators, and some of whom are
endangered species, will at a minimum be harassed by the extremely
loud and far traveling LFA sonar., 84 About the same time, another federal
judge in Northern California issued a temporary restraining order blocking
marine geologists from Columbia University and the Georgia Institute of
Technology (funded by the National Science Foundation) from mapping
the sub-sea floor of the Gulf of California (within the territorial waters of
Mexico) with 220 db sound blasts that had killed at least two beaked
whales. 5
If U.S. judges eventually allow the Navy and other researchers to proceed
with this powerful new sonar, this activity is sure to be challenged at the
international level. The unusually loud sounds emitted in the LFAS
process would certainly be considered "pollution" under Article 1(1)(4)
of the Law of the Sea Convention, which is defined as:
Environmental Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act.
83. Evans, supra note 80, at 1013.
84. Id. at 1053. Although Magistrate Judge LaPorte found that the Navy's
activities violated four federal statutes, she accepted the testimony of the NMFS experts
regarding the impact of LFAS on marine mammals over the sharply conflicting
testimony presented by the Natural Resources Defense Counsel. Judge LaPorte wrote:
"The law is clear ... that when qualified experts on both sides reach carefully reasoned
but different conclusions, the Court must defer to the agency's experts" Id. at 1017.
Other courts dealing with ocean environmental issues have taken a more skeptical
view of the scientific opinions offered by federal agencies. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Counsel v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that
courts "do not hear cases merely to rubber stamp agency actions" and criticizing the
agency's scientific conclusions as ones that could only be correct in "Superman Comics'
Bizarro world, where reality is turned upside down"); Greenpeace v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (treating the views of the
two sides' experts as having equal credibility and issued the injunction sought by
plaintiffs despite the contrary testimony of the agency's experts).
85. Center for Biological Diversity, Court Order Blocks Whale Killing in Gulf of
California, Oct. 29, 2002, at http://www.endangeredearth.org/alerts/result.asp?index=
1210 (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (summarizing issuance of temporary restraining order
by Magistrate Judge James Larson in the case of Center for Biological Diversity v.
National Science Foundation, 2002 WL 31548073 (N.D.Cal. 2002)). The sound source
at issue here was generated by air guns that release a compressed air bubble that
oscillates in the water, creating sound waves that reflect off the sub-surface geologic
layers to be recorded by the ship, rather than a sonar system as used by the Navy.
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities. (Emphasis added).
Sound is a "form of energy manifested by small pressure and/or particle
velocity variations in a continuous medium.,8 6 "While the definition [of
"pollution" in the Law of the Sea Convention] was ... not drafted with
acoustic pollution in mind, the inclusion of 'energy' implies that noise can
be a form of marine pollution under the terms of the LOS Convention."
87
Although the U.S. Navy did prepare an EIS, the scientific tests it relied
upon were woefully inadequate because they did not test the effects
above 155 db; even so, these tests demonstrated that LFAS will have
significant negative impacts on marine mammals.
88
VII. SELECTED MARITIME BOUNDARIES IN THE PACIFIC
Because the Pacific is filled with so many countries and affiliated islands,
it is inevitable that maritime boundary delimitation would raise some
complexities. Many of the maritime boundaries have been resolved by using
the equidistance principle, but some remain unresolved. The following
examples focus on the maritime boundaries between U.S. Pacific territories
and possessions and their neighbors. They illustrate the complexities of
maritime boundaries in this region.
A. United States (American Samoa) and Samoa
8 9
American Samoa and Samoa (formerly called Western Samoa) are
separated by a narrow strait 32 nautical miles wide. Samoa has a land
area of 1,100 square miles. Its population in 2001 numbered 179,058.90
American Samoa encompasses a land area of approximately 77 square
86. W. JOHN RICHARDSON ET AL., MARINE MAMMALS AND NOISE 544 (1995).
87. Harm M. Dotinga & Alex G. Oude Elferink, Acoustic Pollution in the Oceans:
The Search for Legal Standards, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 151, 158 (2000).
88. See CHRISTOPHER W. CLARKELLISON ET AL., SURTASS Low-FREQUENCY
SOUND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAM, PHASE I, SPECIES: BLUE AND FIN WHALES,
SEPT.-OCT. 1997, at 30-31 fig.28 (Feb. 27, 1998), available at http://www.surtass-lfa-
eis.comlResearch/index/htm; PETER TYACK & CHRISTOPHER CLARK, SURTASS Low-
FREQUENCY SouND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAM, PHASE II, SPECIES: GRAY WHALES,
JANUARY 1998, at 22-25 (June 23, 1998) available at http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/
Research/index.htm.
89. The material in this section is adapted and updated from Sherry Broder & Jon
Van Dyke, Ocean Boundaries in the South Pacific, 4 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 50-57 (1982).
90. U.S. Agency Census Bureau, The World Factbook International Data Base,
available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ws.htmlcensus.gov/ipc/
idbsum/wssum.txt (last visited Aug. 20, 2004).
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miles9' and had a population of 67,084 in 2001.92 Samoa is thus 14
times as large as American Samoa in land area and has about three times
as many residents.
Through a circumstance of geography, American Samoa can potentially
claim an exclusive economic zone of 114,000 square nautical miles; if
the equidistance approach were applied, Samoa would be entitled to a
zone of only 38,100 square nautical miles.93 With Wallis (France) 190
nautical miles to the west, Tafahi (Tonga) 142 nautical miles to the
south,94 Swains Island (American Samoa) 190 nautical miles to the
north, and Tutuila Island (American Samoa) thirty-two nautical miles
to the east,95 Samoa is blocked in all directions from claiming a full
200-mile exclusive economic zone. Moreover, Tonga's rectangular historic
claim 96 creates a conflict at the south-eastern edge of Samoa's ocean
boundary. The situation is thus ripe for application of those equitable
principles that would give Samoa a more proportionate share of ocean
territory. Negotiations regarding this boundary were held in 2004.
Samoa, which became independent in 1962, consists of two main
islands (Savai'i and Upolu) and seven small islands (Apolima, Manono,
Fanuatopu, Namua, Nuutele, Nuulua, and Nuusafee).97 In 1977, its
Legislative Assembly passed the Exclusive Economic Zone Act of
1977,98 which established an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles
91. Am. Samoa Development Planning Office, Economic Development Plan for
American Samoa 1979-1984, at 111-5 (1979).
92. U.S. Agency Census Bureau, supra note 90. In 1889, Samoa was divided into
Western Samoa and American Samoa along 171 degrees west longitude, with Germany
acquiring Western Samoa in return for renouncing its claims in Tonga and West Africa
to Great Britain. JOHN W. HART ET AL., HISTORY OF SAMOA 87 (1971).
93. J.R.V. Prescott, International Maritime Boundaries in the Southwest Pacific
Ocean, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEAN DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE PACIFIC BASIN
498 (Edward L. Miles & Scott Allen, eds., 1983).
94. Id. This distance is measured from Asuisui on Savai'i Island to the nearest
point on Tafahi Island.
95. Id.
96. See Broder & Van Dyke, supra note 89, at 9-15.
97. W. SKINNER, HANDBOOK OF WESTERN SAMOA 17 (1925). Savai'i and Upolu
comprise most of the land area. Savi'i accounts for 660 square miles, Upolu for 430
square miles. Only Apolina and Manono of the smaller islands are inhabited. The rest
are near the fringe reef surrounding Upolu. J. Adren, The Political Development of
Western Samoa from Mandate to Independence 4-6 (1964) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Oklahoma) (on file with author).
98. Reprinted in Territorial Sea Act of 1971 (Western Samoa), U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER. B/18, Supp. 29, at 33 (1976) (text transmitted through the Chargd
d'Affaires a.i. of New Zealand to the United Nations in a note verbale of July 9, 1974).
measured from the baselines described in the Territorial Seas Act of
1971. 99 Despite the potential jurisdictional overlaps resulting from this
claim, no reservations were immediately raised by Tonga or American
Samoa.
American Samoa is an unorganized and unincorporated territory of the
United States. 00 The main group contains six islands: Tutuila, Aunuu,
Tau, Ofu, Olosega, and Rose Island. The United States claimed a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone around the territory in 1983. l01
1. Specific Problem Areas-Rose Island
Rose Island is an atoll approximately eighty miles southeast of Tau
Island in the Manua Group of American Samoa.10 2 Plant life exists on
the atoll, including coconuts planted around 1870 by the German
promoters of a fishing station.' 3 It has been uninhabited for most of
recorded history, although one writer reported in 1924 that one of the
Samoans employed in conjunction with the fishing station remained on
the island with his family after the project had been discontinued.
10 4
Rose, therefore, has only a tenuous claim under Article 121 of the Law
of the Sea Convention to be entitled to generate an exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf.10 5 But it was used as a basepoint in the
treaties delimiting the maritime boundary between the United States and
the Cook Islands' 6 and between the United States and Niue.1
0 7
99. Reprinted in id. at 37 (as noted in Robert B. Krueger & Myron H. Nordquist,
The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific
Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 348 (1979)).
100. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 492-94; Stanley Laughlin, The
Application of the Constitution in United State. Territories: American Samoa, A Case
Study, 2 U. HAW. L. REv. 337, 361-62 (1981); David A. Tate, What's Going On in
American Samoa? 79 CASE & COMMENT 26 (1974). Residents of American Samoa are
"nationals" of the United States with rights to travel to and from other parts of the
American political community. Id. at 28-29.
After the 1889 division of the two Samoas, see note 92 supra, the American islands
were placed under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of the Navy and
designated as Tutuila Naval Station. In 1911, "American Samoa" was adopted as the
name of the territory. In 1951, the territory's administration was transferred to the
United States Department of the Interior. PACIFIC ISLANDS YEARBOOK 45 (John Carter
ed., 14th ed., 198 1) [hereinafter PACIFIC ISLANDS Y.B.].
101. Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. § 22-23 (1983).
102. JOHIN W. COULTER, LAND UTILIZATION IN AMERICAN SAMOA 43 (Kraus Reprint
Co., 1941); WILLIAM A. SETCHELL, AMERICAN SAMOA 227 (1924).
103. COULTER, supra note 102, at 43; SETCHELL, supra note 102, at 247.
104. SETCHELL, supra note 102, at 247.
105. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Joseph R. Morgan, and Jonathan Gurish, The
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: When do Uninhabited
Islands Generate an EEZ?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 425 (1988).
106. 1 INT'L MARITIME BOUNDARIES 987 (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander
eds., 1993).
[VOL. 6: 143, 2004] Challenges in the Pacific
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
2. Specific Problem Areas-Swains Island
Swains Island is a verdant ring of sand and coral, with a land area of
about 3.5 square kilometers10 8 and a maximum elevation of about six
meters. The island is historically and geographically a part of the
Tokelau Islands, 10 9 and many Tokelauans consider the islet to belong to
them, even though it was recognized as being under U.S. sovereignty in
the maritime boundary treaty between the United States and New
Zealand (on behalf of Tokelau).110 Over the years, it has maintained a
small population of individuals of Samoan and Tokelauan extraction,1"
but no one is permanently living on the island at present." 
2
Although American Samoa, as an island community, can advance
many of the equitable arguments in favor of establishing an archipelagic
regime for itself, it cannot qualify as an archipelagic regime drawing
archipelagic baselines around all its islands under the provisions of the
Law of the Sea Convention. 1 3 The United States has declared a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone around American Samoa and has asserted
that an equidistant line should be drawn between each and every islet in
107. U.S. Dept. of State Bureau of Oceans and Int'l Envtl. and Scientific Affairs,
Limits in the Seas No. 119-Maritime Boundary: United States-Niue, at 2 (July 30,
1997) [hereinafter Limits in the Seas No. 119], available at http://www.lawlfsu.edu/
library/collection/LimitsinSeas/numerical/php.
108. Id.
109. Tokelau is a territory directly north of the Samoas under New Zealand
administration. Shortly after 1841, Tokelau Islanders formed a colony on Swains Island,
which was originally included within the Tokelau islands as part of the Union Group and
was then known as Olosenga. PAC. ISLANDS Y.B., supra note 100, at 55-56. The Union
Group was subsequently incorporated into the British colonies of the Gilbert and Ellice
Islands in 1916. The island still has a number of Tokelau-style homes. Id. at 56; J.
GRAY, AMERIKA SAMOA 211 (1960).
110. See Treaty on Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the United
States and Tokelau discussed infra at notes 118-20. In 1925, Swains Island was annexed
by the United States and made an administrative part of American Samoa. H.R.J. Res.
294, 68th Cong., 43 Stat. 1357 (1925).
111. PAC. ISLANDS Y.B., supra note 100, at 55.
112. The island has in recent years been owned by the Jennings family, which has
historically exploited the atoll for copra, producing up to 200 tons in some earlier years.
Id. at 56.
113. Articles 46 and 47 of the Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 39, permit only
"States" to declare themselves to be archipelagoes. Because American Samoa is not
independent, it is apparently foreclosed from making such a claim. If independence were
declared, however, or if the "State" requirement in the Convention were interpreted to include
dependent territories, American Samoa could follow the precedent of Fiji and declare itself to
be an archipelago using its main islands as base points, but it would have to exclude Rose and
Swains Islands to satisfy the 9-1 water-to-land ratio test in Article 47(1). Id.
American Samoa and the opposite islands of other countries, which would
permit American Samoa to establish ocean boundaries disproportionate
in relation to its neighbors. Swains Island would account for about one-
third of the total claim for American Samoa and at the same time would
severely restrict the ocean space of Samoa.
1 14
Application of the coastline-proportionality principle, recognized by
the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Case115 and many
subsequent cases, may be appropriate to a delimitation between American
Samoa and Samoa. The Court has held that a reasonable degree of
proportionality should exist between the extent of the exclusive
economic zone and the lengths of the coastlines of the respective nations. If
an equidistance line were drawn, Samoa, with a land area more than 14
times that of American Samoa, would be entitled to only a third of the
expanse of exclusive economic zone that American Samoa could claim.
Coastline-proportionality, as applied in this context, would require
giving Samoa a larger exclusive economic zone. The U.S. position,
however, has always been that Swains Island should "be given full effect
in an equidistant delimitation with neighboring countries."
16
B. United States (American Samoa) and Tonga
In 1986, Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans David A. Colson reported
that the United States has informally assumed that the equidistance line
is the maritime boundary in this situation as well as in the boundary
with Samoa and Niue "without objection from the neighboring countries,




114. Prescott, supra note 93, at 507. Prescott has characterized Western Samoa
(now Samoa) as "zone-locked" and "the most unfortunate territory in the region in terms
of the area of water and seabed which can be claimed." Id. He explained that it would
"be surprising if Western Samoa did not develop a sense of injustice" and that "the most
obvious claim for an equitable rather than an equidistant boundary would be directed
against American Samoa's ownership of Swains Island." Id.
115. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 43,
52, 54 (Feb. 20).
116. In a 1986 letter, David A. Colson, U.S. Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans,
explained the U.S. position regarding Swains as follows:
The position was notified to the neighboring governments of Western Samoa
and New Zealand on behalf of Tokelau .... It has since appeared as the limit of
[United States] fishery jurisdiction/EEZ on [United States] nautical charts. As
well, the treaty Between the United States of America and New Zealand on the
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the United States of America
and Tokelau, done Dec. 2, 1980, [T.I.A.S. 10775 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1983)], utilizes this approach, albeit the equidistant line is simplified.
Letter from David A. Colson to Jon M. Van Dyke (Oct. 1, 1986).
117. David A. Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the Unites States: Where
Are We Now? in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 464, 469 (Thomas A.
Clingan, Jr. ed., 1988). Prescott, supra note 93, at 523, reports that an equidistant
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C. United States (American Samoa) and New Zealand (Tokelau)
A treaty resolving disputed claims over islands and delimiting a
maritime boundary was reached between the United States and New
Zealand on December 2, 1980, which entered into force on September
3, 1983.118 The United States relinquished its claims to the islands of
Atafu, Nukunono, and Fakaofo, and New Zealand recognized U.S.
jurisdiction over Swains Island 19 and drew an equidistance boundary
line between these islands, giving full effect to Swains Island. 120
D. United States (American Samoa) and Niue
Niue consists of a single island, with about half as much land area as
Washington, D.C. It is in free association with New Zealand,1 21 has a
population of about 2,100, and is located south of American Samoa.
122
A maritime boundary was neotiated in 1997,123 but the U.S. Congress
has still not ratified this treaty. The boundary established by this treaty is
based on an equidistant line between Niue's island and the islands of
American Samoa, including Rose Island in the East, with each island
given full status in relation to each other. The waters in this region are deep,
no resource issue was considered relevant, and no special circumstances
of any sort were identified by either party.!'25
maritime boundary between American Samoa and Tonga would extend for 72 nautical
miles.
118. Treaty on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary, Dec. 2, 1980, U.S.-N.Z.,
T.I.A.S. No. 10,775, at 2073; 1 INT'L MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 106, at 1125.
119. The treaty does not refer directly to Swains Island, but notes in its preamble
"that the United States exercises sovereignty over and administers the islands known as
American Samoa and that New Zealand has not claimed or administered as part of
Tokelau any of the island presently administered by the United States as part of
American Samoa." 1 INT'L MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 106, at 1131.
120. Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United
States, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 729, 749 (1981); Prescott, supra note 93, at 503.
121. The United States confirmed from New Zealand that Niue had the requisite
competence to negotiate a maritime boundary treaty on its own behalf. Limits in the
Seas No. 119, supra note 107, at 2.
122. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ws.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
123. Limits in the Seas No. 119, supra note 107.
124. A hearing was scheduled to be held on this treaty by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on July 18, 2002, but the meeting was cancelled subject to being
rescheduled.
125. Limits in the Seas No. 119, supra note 107.
E. United States (American Samoa) and the Cook Islands
The treaty establishing the 566 nautical-mile-long equidistance all-
purpose maritime boundary between American Samoa and the Cook
Islands was signed on June 11, 1980 and entered into force on September 8,
1983. 26 It utilizes twenty-five turning points, recognizes the ability of
each island to generate maritime jurisdiction, and recognizes no special
or unusual geographical characteristics in the region. "The parties decided
that all islands and any associated drying fringing reefs and low-tide
elevations, regardless of size, location, and population, were entitled to
full effect in determining an equidistant line, and that these features were
entitled to generate the full scope of maritime jurisdictions possible."
' 127
American Samoa's uninhabited Rose Island and its currently uninhabited
Swains Island were used as basepoints in determining the equidistance
line. 128
One significant element of this treaty was the U.S. recognition that the
Cook Islands (which is "freely associated" with New Zealand) had the
legal competence to enter into a treaty relationship with the United
States. 12 9 As part of this agreement, the United States recognized Cook
Island sovereignty over four islands that the United States had
previously claimed-Pukapuka (Danger Island), Manahiki, Rakahanga,
and Penrhyn.130 These inhabited13 1 islands were used as basepoints by
the Cook Islands to form the equidistant boundary line.
F. United States (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands) and Japan
In 1981, the U.S. maritime boundary negotiators noted: "Boundaries
remain to be negotiated by the United States with Japan, Kiribati, Tonga,
Western Samoa, New Zealand on behalf of Niue, the Marshall Islands,
and the Federated States of Micronesia."1 32 During the subsequent two
decades, no noticeable progress has been made with regard to the
delimitation of any of these boundaries, except for the one with Niue.
The lack of urgency was explained in 1981 as follows:
126. Treaty on Friendship and Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary, Sept. 8,
1983, U.S.-Cook Islands, T.I.A.S. No. 10,774,; 1 INT'L MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra
note 106, at 985.
127. 1 INT'L MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 106, at 987.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 986.
130. Id.
131. Feldman & Colson, supra note 120, at 748.
132. Id. at 753 n.95.
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In none of the outstanding situations would there seem to be any difference in
basic approach as to how the boundary should be determined. Moreover, as the
regions involved are not areas of particular resource activity, there does not
seem to be any urgency to move quickly to establish the boundaries. Therefore,
in keeping with past practice, U.S. maritime boundaries in these regions will
likely be established as opportunities arise or as interest in doing so is
asserted. 133
Geographer Robert W. Smith has observed that sometimes "good
political relations between neighboring States will result in boundary
delimitations being given a low priority" and that if there are "[l]ittle
known resources" then there will be "little incentive to focus on the
creation of a maritime boundary."' 134 The "resource activity" in the Pacific
has increased dramatically since these words were written, and the
fishing for tuna in the Western Pacific is now intense. The United States
has utilized de facto equidistance lines for purposes of its internal
regulation of fishing activities and has published such lines in the
Federal Register. The U.S. Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management
Council also routinely publishes maps of the U.S. exclusive economic
zones utilizing an equidistance line to mark all these unresolved
maritime boundaries.
35
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is a
chain of 14 islands that had been part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands but is now formally part of the United States, governed, as
explained above, by a 1975 covenant that defines the relationship
between the United States and the CNMI.136  The CNMI has some
limited authority over its offshore resources, but they are primarily
managed by the United States, which is also responsible for foreign
relations and defense of the CNMI. The northernmost island in the
CNMI chain is the uninhabited Farallon de Pajaros, which is two
kilometers in diameter and consists completely of an explosive volcano,
which has erupted 16 times since 1864, and as recently as 1967.137
133. Id. at 754.
134. Robert W. Smith, United States-Canada Maritime Boundaries: A Study of
Negotiations, Arbitration, and Management 4-3-18 (Conference on Marine Policy and
the Korea Economy: Issues and Opportunities, Korea Maritime Institute and University
of Rhode Island, Oct. 22-24, 1998).
135. See, e.g., W. Pac. Reg'l Fishery Mgmt. Council, PAC. ISLANDS FISHERY NEws,
Spring 2001, at 1.
136. See Van Dyke, Evolving LegalRelationships, supra note 1, at 480-87.
137. Farallon de Pajaros, Mariana Islands, at http://volcano.und.nodak.edu/vwdocs/
volc images/southeast-asia/mariana/falleron.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
Farallon de Pajaros seems to dramatically fit the definition in Article
12 1(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention of a "rock" that "cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of [its] own."' 38 Nonetheless, the
United States has assumed that it would be used as a basepoint in
delimiting the maritime boundary with Japan, which has isolated tiny
islands within 400 nautical miles. In 1986, Colson reported that no
difference in approach existed between the United States and Japan, "but
no attempt to negotiate an agreement with Japan has yet been made. 139
In its September 1994 Letter of Submittal of the Law of the Sea
Convention to the President, the Secretary of State included the statement
that: "Regarding the United States and Japan, they have recorded an
understanding that recognizes that the respective outer limits of their
maritime jurisdiction coincide and constitute a line of delimitation.
1 40
The parties apparently understand this somewhat enigmatic statement to
mean that the equidistance line between their closest islands constitutes
the maritime delimitation line between them. The map used by the Western
Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council shows an equidistance
line between the northernmost island in the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands and the closest Japanese island to its
northwest. 141
G. United States (Guam) and the Federated States of Micronesia
Guam, as explained earlier, is an unincorporated territory of the United
States,142 with a land area about three times the size of Washington, D.C.
and a current population of about 155,000.143 To its south are the islands
of Yap and Chuuk States in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).
The United States has assumed an equidistant line between Guam and
the nearest FSM islands, but no formal maritime boundary has been
delimited.
138. See generally Van Dyke, Morgan and Gurish, Northwestern Hawaiian Islands,
supra note 105.
139. Colson, supra note 117, at 469.
140. Letter from President William Clinton to the United States Senate, Message
and Commentary Accompanying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of the Part XI Upon Their
Transmittal to the United States Senate for its Advice and Consent, S. TREATY Doc. No.
103-39, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted in 7 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L. L. REv. 77, 185
(1994).
141. W. Pac. Reg'1 Fishery Mgmt. Council, supra note 135.
142. See Van Dyke, Evolving Legal Relationships, supra note 1, at 488-91.
143. Details about Guam, at http://ns.gov.gu/details.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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H. United States (Wake) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
Wake is a 6.5 square kilometer atoll claimed by the United States in 1899
for a cable station, used extensively in World War II, and subsequently
as a stopover for refieling and emergency landings. 144 It never had an
indigenous population, but the Republic of the Marshall Islands claims
the islet, 145 based on the visits to the islet that its people historically
engaged in to gather bird bones. As of October 2001, 123 civilian contract
personnel and one U.S. Army civilian were reported to be on the
island. 146 The United States claims a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic
zone around the islet, which, if valid, would overlap with the EEZ
claimed by the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Because of the dispute
over sovereignty of the islet, it may be difficult to address or resolve the
maritime boundary.
I. United States (Baker/Howland) and Kiribati
Located at 0, 13' N., 1760 31' W, Baker Island is an arid coral island
rising some five to six meters above sea level. The United States sent a
group of young men to the islet in 1935 to solidify its claim to ownership,
and they built a landing strip, a light house, and some substantial dwellings
during that period and World War I1.147 Later, the Coast Guard operated a
Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN) station, but it is now uninhabited.
Howland is about 90 miles (144 kin) north of Baker at 0' 48' N, 1760
38' W. It is 2.5 km by 1 km, with sparse vegetation, supporting a large
sea bird population. Guano was mined between 1858 and 1890, and a
few U.S. colonists lived on the island between 1935 and the start of
World War II to reinforce U.S. claims to possession. An airstrip was
built on the island, but it is presently uninhabited, visited periodically by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
In 1986, Colson said that "Kiribati has been notified of U.S. willingness
to negotiate boundaries based upon equidistance. Kiribati expressed
some interest, but indicated it would need time to prepare.' 48 In the
meantime, U.S. maps show an equidistance line between Baker and the
144. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 122.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Burl Burlingame, Boys of the Panala'au, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Apr. 28,
2002, at D1.
148. Colson, supra note 117, at 469.
closest Kiribati islands. 149 Prescott has reported that an equidistant line
between Baker and Kiribati would extend for 322 nautical miles. 50
J. United States (Palmyra) and Kiribati
Palmyra, located at 50 53' N. and 1620 5' W., consists of some fifty islets
with a combined land area of two square miles. Various economic endeavors
have been attempted in this rainy atoll. It has maintained a population of
several dozen at various times and is a favorite stopping spot for yachts
traveling across the Pacific, but it is currently uninhabited. No formal
maritime boundary has been negotiated with Kiribati, and U.S. maps show
an equidistance line between Palmyra and the Kiribati island of Teraina
(Washington)' 5' Prescott has reported that an equidistant line between
Palmyra and Kiribati would extend for 382 nautical miles.1
52
K. United States (Jarvis) and Kiribati
Jarvis has been described as "a small, bleak bowl-shaped place, about
3 [by] 1.5 [kilometers], lying by itself just south of the equator, [0 degrees,
23 min. S. and] 160 deg[rees 0.2 min.] W. long."'153 U.S. citizens occupied
the islet between 1935 and 1942 to fortify the U.S. claim to sovereignty,
but it is presently uninhabited. No formal maritime boundary has been
negotiated with Kiribati, and U.S. maps show an equidistance line
between Jarvis and the adjacent Kiribati islands.1 54 Prescott has reported




It may be hard to translate lessons from the Pacific to other areas
because the Pacific is unique in its huge size and its small, scattered
population. Most of the Pacific is not industrialized and its pollution
problems are modest compared to those of other areas.
But certain lessons are evident. When the benefits have been seen to
be high, as with regard to the exploitation of the important fishery
resources of the Pacific, a strong and coordinated cooperative body (the
FFA) has been established, with a skilled secretariat, and it has taken
149. W. Pac. Reg'1 Fishery Mgmt. Council, supra note 135.
150. Prescott, supra note 93, at 524.
151. W. Pac. Reg'1 Fishery Mgmt. Council, supra note 135.
152. Id,
153. PAC. ISLANDS Y.B., supra note 100, at 268.
154. W. Pac. Reg'l Fishery Mgmt Council, supra note 135.
155. Prescott, supra note 93, at 524.
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important initiatives and provided significant benefits for the region.
This initiative has been taken, perhaps, because the small islands feel
vulnerable when dealing with the industrialized distant-water fishing
countries, similar to the vulnerability found among the Caribbean
islanders and the small island communities in the Indian Ocean.
Although those countries (mostly in the Western Pacific) with greater
fishing resources have coordinated their actions to some extent, they
have been relatively generous toward those island countries with fewer
fish in their waters, and the regime has maintained its cohesion through
this sense of cooperation and sharing.
With regard to environmental protection, the countries of the region
have adopted sound treaties and established a small secretariat to
coordinate environmental activities, but almost all the funding has come
from outside the region because most threats to the environment are
distant and the priority for environmental protection on a regional level
is low. But when they perceive a regional threat, they do act effectively
together. Pacific Islanders acted in a coordinated manner to demonstrate
their abhorrence of nuclear testing by adopting the 1985 South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and they acted to ban driftnets through the
adoption of the 1989 South Pacific Driftnet Convention and several U.N.
General Assembly resolutions. More recently, they have expressed their
strong concern about the movement of ultrahazardous cargoes through
their waters and about global warming and sea-level rise, but they have
not yet been effective in stopping these shipments or in forcing an
effective global response to global warming.
Pacific Islanders have created functioning regional organizations that
have played important roles in allowing the small islands to speak with a
more uniform and louder voice when talking to the larger powers. The
island communities also have a natural cultural affinity. 156 But political
conflicts within some of the countries (particularly Fiji and the Solomon
Islands) have caused the regional organizations to be less effective than
they might otherwise have been, and the fact that many countries in the
region are dependent on outside aid makes them less able to criticize the
activities of those countries (like Japan) that give them aid.
The SPREP Secretariat has established a sound agenda, but it has
156. The Pacific Islands have not, however, made any governmental moves to
create a regional human rights organization. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Prospects for the
Development of Intergovernmental Human Rights Bodies in Asia and the Pacific, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989).
avoided the most controversial subjects, focusing on consensus- and
capacity-building rather than confrontation. The global-warming/climate-
change issue is another one where we see Pacific Islanders working
together effectively in international forums to ensure that their voices are
heard. Although such coordinated action may not involve a "regime" in
the legal or political-science sense, it does indicate recognition of the
value of cooperation. To summarize, a good beginning has been made
in the Pacific, but how effective these initiatives will be in the long run
remains to be determined.
